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China has been the most successful developing country 
in this modern era of globalization.  Since initiating 
economic reform after 1978, its economy has expanded 
at a steady rate over 8 percent per capita, fueling 
historically unprecedented poverty reduction (the poverty 
rate declined from over 60 percent to 7 percent in 2007). 
Other developing countries struggling to grow and 
reduce poverty are naturally interested in what has been 
the source of this impressive growth and what, if any, 
lessons they can take from China. This paper focuses 
on four features of modern China that have changed 
significantly between the pre-reform period and today.  
The Chinese themselves call their reform program Gai Ge 
Kai Feng, “change the system, open the door.” “Change 
the system” means altering incentives and ownership, that 
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is, shifting the economy from near total state ownership 
to one in which private enterprise is dominant. “Open 
the door” means exactly what it says, liberalizing trade 
and direct investment. A third lesson is the development 
of high-quality infrastructure: China’s good roads, 
reliable power, world-class ports, and excellent cell 
phone coverage throughout the country are apparent to 
any visitor. What is less well known is that most of this 
infrastructure has been developed through a policy of 
“cost recovery” that prices infrastructure services at levels 
sufficient to finance the capital cost as well as operations 
and maintenance. A fourth important lesson is China’s 
careful attention to agriculture and rural development, 
complemented by rural-urban migration.   
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1. Introduction  
China has been the most successful developing country in this modern era of 
globalization.  It was one of the poorest countries in the world in 1980.  Since initiating 
economic reform after 1978 its economy has expanded at a steady rate over 8% per 
capita, leading to a dramatic improvement in living standards (Figure 1). This growth has 
fueled historically unprecedented poverty reduction: the share of the population living 
beneath the World Bank’s “cost of basic needs” poverty line declined from over 60% at 
the beginning of economic reform in 1978 to 7% in 2007.
1  Other developing countries 
struggling to grow and reduce poverty are naturally interested in what has been the source 
of this impressive growth and what, if any, lessons other developing countries can take 
from China. 
There are many different factors that have led to China’s success.  Some of these 
are deep-seated features of Chinese culture.  For example, the Confucian ethic put a 
strong emphasis on education.  Already in 1870 21% of the adult population in China was 
literate, far ahead of other parts of the developing world such as Latin America (15%) or 
South Asia (3%) (Morrisson and Murtin 2005).   Confucian societies also tend to have 
very high savings rates.  However, these long-standing features of Chinese society cannot 
by themselves explain recent economic performance.  Between 1870 and 1978 the 
Chinese economy did not perform particularly well, despite the fact that those long-
standing characteristics were in place.  In this paper I am going to focus on a number of 
features of modern China that have changed significantly between the pre-reform period 
and today.  These changes provide interesting lessons for other developing countries.  
                                                 
1 The “cost of basic needs” approach determines the amount of consumption that a person needs in order to 
have 2100 calories per day plus the other basic necessities of life.   
  1China’s experience shows that these things can be changed relatively quickly. Of course 
countries should not blindly copy China or any other model: the measures adopted in 
China would not have exactly the same effect if adopted somewhere else.  But I think that 
countries can learn from each other and bring these lessons to bear on solving their own 
unique development challenges. 
A good place to start is with how the Chinese themselves describe their reform 
program: Gai Ge Kai Feng.  This translates roughly as “change the system, open the 
door.”  “Change the system” means altering incentives and ownership, that is, shifting the 
economy from near total state ownership to one in which private enterprise is dominant.  
The next section describes how China created a good investment climate for private 
entrepreneurship and how private investment has become the driving force of the 
economy.  An interesting feature of China that led to this result is a high degree of local 
autonomy that resulted in competition among literally hundreds of cities to create a good 
investment climate and attract investment.    
“Open the door” means exactly what it says.  Before 1978 China had one of the 
most closed economies in the world.  It unilaterally liberalized trade and has become one 
of the most open developing countries.  Concerning foreign investment, China welcomed 
direct investment that brought technology, management skills, and global production 
networks, and managed the regime for direct investment in order to get the most capacity 
building for Chinese workers and firms.  Up to now, the economy remains quite closed to 
portfolio investment.  This pattern is the exact opposite of that followed by many 
developing countries in the 1970s and 1980s when countries borrowed internationally but 
were relatively hostile to direct investment.  The open door policy has led to China 
  2becoming the largest destination of direct foreign investment and to its emergence as a 
manufacturing and trading superpower.   
Visitors to Chinese cities are always struck by the quality of Chinese 
infrastructure: good roads, reliable power, world-class ports, and excellent cell phone 
coverage throughout the country.  What is less well known is that most of this 
infrastructure has been developed through a policy of “cost recovery” that prices 
infrastructure services at levels sufficient to finance the capital cost as well as operations 
and maintenance.  China has been able to rapidly expand its infrastructure network by 
borrowing at commercial interest rates and servicing the resulting debt through 
appropriate prices for power, roads, rail, and telecom. 
  A fourth important lesson is the role of agricultural and rural development, 
complemented by rural-urban migration.  China is a densely populated, resource-scarce 
country that started reform with 80% of its population rural.  Grain output per hectare 
was already pretty high.  So, raising incomes for the large rural population required a 
number of complementary measures.  First, the shift to private entrepreneurship started in 
the agricultural sector, well before it came to cities.  The “household responsibility 
system” was the initial step in a process of continually strengthening land tenure rights 
for farmers.  Second, agricultural markets were liberalized, culminating in China’s 
commitment to a very liberal agricultural trade regime when it joined the WTO.  These 
first two measures were complemented by strong efforts in agricultural research and 
extension.  The result was some modest further improvement in grain productivity, plus 
very dramatic increases in diversification and earnings from products such as fruit, tea, 
meat, and milk.  These successes enabled China to take some land out of agricultural 
  3production and return it to ecological uses, helping the long-term sustainability of 
agriculture.  China is one of the few countries that has increased its forest cover, from 
12% to 18%.     
  Even with these advances in agriculture, however, the productivity gap between 
urban and rural employment has remained large.  Hence, migration from low-
productivity rural employment to higher productivity urban employment is an important 
source of growth.  China has a registration system that controls and to some extent limits 
migration.  Still, the system has been flexible enough to allow more than 200 million 
people to relocate from rural to urban locations.  This migration has involved very 
substantial relocation from interior locations to coastal ones.  
    While the main theme of this paper is that there are positive lessons that other 
developing countries can draw from China, it is also the case that there are some negative 
consequences of rapid growth that have not been dealt with as well in China as they could 
have been.  Such rapid growth would inevitably put stress on the natural environment, but 
lax enforcement of environmental regulations resulted in more pollution than was 
necessary.  Despite some progress with cleanup efforts, pollution levels in China continue 
to be too high in the sense that the health costs of pollution are greater than the cost of 
cleanup.  Section 6 <okay?> reviews some of these environmental issues and draws some 
lessons from China’s negative experience, that is, mistakes that other countries will want 
to avoid 
 
.       
 
  42. “Change the system” 
Before economic reform China had a planned system based on collectivized 
agriculture and state ownership of the means of production.  In 1978 3% of retail goods 
were traded at market prices, and 6% of farm commodities.  State-owned enterprises 
accounted for 77% of industrial production, and the rest came from collectives that were 
basically local state enterprises (Table 1).  China has gradually reformed ownership over 
the past 25 years, starting with agricultural reforms detailed in a later section.
2   In the 
first decade of reform it opened up some locations to private foreign investment, allowed 
more scope to township and village enterprises to operate on a market basis, and 
introduced various reforms in state firms.  These reforms accelerated after a famous trip 
by Deng Xiaoping to the dynamic southern coastal areas in 1992.  By 1995 China’s 
industrial output was divided roughly evenly among state enterprises, collectives and 
private firms.   
  Since 1995 the private sector has expanded very rapidly and by 2003 accounted 
for 72% of industrial output.  In this period many collectives and state firms were 
privatized, and entry of new private firms was encouraged.  In 2005 the statistical bureau 
and the World Bank carried out a large survey of 12,400 manufacturing firms in 120 
cities (World Bank 2006).  The firms in the stratified random sample had in the aggregate 
more than 10 million employees, so that this is roughly a 10% sample of manufacturing.  
In this sample only 8% of firms are majority state-owned; 27% are foreign-invested; the 
large majority of firms are domestically owned private firms (Table 2).  The Chinese 
economy is now largely based on the Chinese private sector.  The sample also found that 
                                                 
2 Early stages of China’s reform are described in Lin (1988) and Lin (1992).  See Rawski (1994) on the 
industrial reforms in the 1990s.  
 
  5the pre-tax rate of return for domestic private firms was quite high, around 20%, similar 
to the high rate of return in foreign-invested firms.  State firms, on the other hand, had 
about one-third that rate of return.  Employment growth for the private firms has been 
nearly 10% per year in recent years; employment in state firms has been contracting at 
3% per year.   
  How has China come to have such a vibrant private sector?  One factor certainly 
is the very good investment climate that one finds in many Chinese cities, especially 
coastal ones.  In general, the burden of bureaucracy and regulation is low compared to 
other developing countries, and the quality of infrastructure very good.  This can be seen 
in some of the indicators from World Bank investment climate surveys carried out in 
different countries.  For example, Chinese firms report that it takes an average of 7 days 
to get a mainline telephone connection, compared to 34 days in African countries (Table 
3).  Chinese firms lose about 1% of output to power outages, compared to an average of 
4% in African surveys, and much higher numbers in some countries (Kenya, 8%; 
Tanzania, Uganda, 10%).  On the regulatory side, many features of doing business are 
relatively easy in China: for example, it takes 32 days to register a property, compared to 
110 days on average in Africa.   
  Why have Chinese cities done so well creating a good climate for private 
investment?  Probably one reason is that a key aspect of reform has been to decentralize 
decision making to provinces and cities.  Chinese cities have then competed actively with 
each other to attract first foreign investment, and more recently, domestic private 
investment.  Among Chinese cities there are significant differences in investment climate, 
firm profitability, and growth rate of the private sector.  Cities that have 50% higher rate 
  6of profit see a higher growth rate of the number of private firms by 10 percentage points 
(Figure 2).  Capital and labor tend to gravitate toward the more successful locations, 
which directly pulls up the overall growth rate.  There is likely to be an indirect effect as 
well as lagging cities feel the pressure to reform and improve.  The growth of certain 
cities is extraordinary: Dongguan in Guangdong province was a town of 300,000 people 
at the beginning of reform.  It has grown into a major industrial city of several million 
people.  Many of the most successful Chinese cities are second-tier cities whose names 
are not well-known worldwide: Dongguan, Foshan, and Shenzhen in Guangdong; 
Xiamen in Fujian; Hangzhou and Wenzhou in Zhejiang; Suzhou in Jiangsu; and Qingdao, 
Linyi, and Yantai in Shandong, to name some good examples. 
 
3. “Open the door” 
Prior to 1978 China was one of the most closed economies in the world.  Foreign 
trade was completely monopolized by one government ministry, and there was in practice 
very little trade with the outside world.  A key component of the reforms launched in 
1978 was to “open the door” to foreign trade and investment.
3  Most of the controls pre-
1978 were administrative, and since then they have gradually been dismantled.  First, a 
limited number of trading companies were allowed to engage in international trade; by 
the mid-1980s this had increased to 8,000.  More and more manufacturing firms were 
given the right to import and export directly.  By 1990 China’s economy was far more 
open than those of the other low-wage countries in Asia.  
                                                 
3 Eckhaus (1997) and Lardy (2002) analyze the importance of liberalizing foreign trade and investment for 
China’s modern development.  
  7  At the same time the economy was gradually opened to direct foreign investment, 
but not to portfolio flows.  Initially, foreign investors were directed to a number of 
special economic zones.  But after the mid-1990s most of the country was open to direct 
investment.  “Special zones” have mostly been important in China as locations that drew 
concentrated infrastructure investment by local government.  The period during which 
special zones were favored with different tax or regulatory policies was relatively brief.  
Of the successful cities mentioned in the section above, only Shenzhen and Xiamen were 
ever special economic zones.  Most of the successful industrial locations in China were 
not favored with special national policies; rather they benefited from the effort of 
competent local authorities to develop infrastructure and relatively easy regulatory 
frameworks.  
  It should be stressed, however, that China adopted a number of measures that 
were aimed at maximizing the capacity building for Chinese workers and firms that came 
from the direct investment.  China was concerned that foreign enterprises would be 
enclaves with little spillover benefit to the rest of the economy.  So, the country has 
always had strict limits on the number of workers that foreign investors could bring into 
the country.  Foreign investors were pushed to the maximum to hire Chinese staff and 
train them.  Initially, foreign investors had to partner with a Chinese state enterprise, 
often in 50-50 joint ventures that left control unclear.  This policy was debatable, as it 
limited the kind of investment that China would get.  It was only after 100% foreign 
subsidiaries were allowed in the 1990s that foreign investment in more technology-
intensive industries started to come to China.  In the auto industry foreign producers had 
to meet strict domestic content requirements (no longer allowed now that China is in the 
  8WTO).  One can debate the utility of specific measures, but in general China had quite an 
activist regime aimed at ensuring that foreign investors employed skilled local labor and 
developed ties outside of their “enclave.”  There are interesting lessons here for other 
developing countries to study.   
  The results of China’s opening to trade and investment are well known.  Between 
1990 and 2006 China’s imports increased at an annual rate of 16%.  China has been a 
major source of new demand for many developing countries in Asia, Latin America, and 
Africa.   The country’s exports also increased at 16% per year over this period.  Annual 
inflows of direct investment have grown steadily, reaching a level of nearly $80 billion in 
2005, making China the number one destination of overseas investors.  Relative to GDP, 
however, China’s investment inflows are not that unusual in Asia: Malaysia, Thailand, 
Vietnam, and Mongolia have comparable levels.   
  Since 1990, at each stage of its development China has kept its trade regime more 
open than other developing countries at the same level of per capita GDP.  In 1990 
China’s average import tariff was 40%, well below those of Bangladesh (94%), India 
(82%), or Pakistan (65%).  Thailand (40%) had the same average tariff rate in 1990.  
Since then China has steadily reduced import tariff rates.  Actual tariff collection in 2006 
was only 2% of import value. There has been a general trend in developing countries to 
reduce protection against imports.  Still, in 2006 tariff collection in Africa was far higher 
than in China: an average of 13% for all of Sub-Saharan Africa and higher rates in some 
countries (e.g., Ethiopia, 18.5%) (Table 3). 
  China’s openness to the global economy goes well beyond import tariffs.  The 
country has also developed very efficient customs administration and ports.  One 
  9question in the World Bank investment climate survey of firms is for manufacturing 
firms that import parts or materials, which is very common worldwide: What was your 
longest customs delay in the past six months?  The average response in Chinese surveys 
is 12 days, compared to twice as long in African surveys.  Ports in China also tend to be 
very efficient.  The cost of exporting a container of goods to the U.S. is quite low, $335.  
It costs almost five times as much ($1561) to send a container from the typical African 
country.   
  The combination of low tariffs, efficient customs, and efficient ports means that 
large numbers of firms in China are very well connected to the international market, and 
that has proved to be one of the key advantages spurring the rapid development of these 
firms.  For many African countries, the formal trade regime is as open as China’s.  
However, problems in customs and ports mean that the actual connection of African 
firms to the global market is weaker.  
 
4. Infrastructure finance and pricing 
Everyone who comes to China is impressed with the infrastructure.  It is not 
surprising that the flagship cities of Beijing and Shanghai have good infrastructure.  What 
is more remarkable is that large numbers of cities one has never heard of have similarly 
good transport infrastructure and reliable power supply.  The rapid expansion of 
infrastructure has been an important factor sustaining China’s growth.  Between 1998 and 
2006 capacity of the power sector grew at 10% per year, keeping pace with the needs of 
the economy.  The rail network, the most extensive in the world, increased its line length 
by more than 10,000 km.  Most rapid has been the expansion of the expressway system 
  10nationwide, which grew in length at a rate of 21% per year over the period, reaching a 
total of 45,339 km by the end of 2006.  
  How has China financed this expansion of infrastructure?  In every sector the 
government played an important initial role, providing some budget capital.  But in recent 
years there is very little additional investment from the budget in these infrastructure 
sectors.  Rather, the key to China’s success has been a policy of nearly full cost recovery.  
In general, infrastructure services are priced to cover the cost of the capital as well as the 
cost of operations and maintenance. 
In the power sector, for example, China set its reform course with the 1985 State 
Council Decree, "Diversify the Sources of Financing for the Power Sector and Implement 
Debt-Repayment Electricity Price for New Power Plants."  This decree put an end to the 
Central Government as sole source of financing for power sector investment and allowed 
local government as well as public and private, foreign and domestic investors to 
participate in power project financing.  Most important, the decree allowed electricity 
price to be set high enough to recover equity investment, serve all the debts, and make a 
reasonable profit. As a result, generation capacity increased from 67 GW in 1981 to 622 
GW in 2006, an average annual growth rate of 9.8%. The first BOT power plant by 
foreign investors, in any developing country, was completed in China in 1987.  The result 
of this cost recovery policy is that China has relatively expensive power for industrial 
use, but a power network that is extensive and reliable.  In 2005 the U.S. dollar price per 
kilowatt hour was higher in China than in the U.S., France, Brazil, or Russia (Figure 3).  
Germany and the U.K. had modestly higher prices; only Japan had a substantially higher 
  11power price than China.
4  China’s experience is that industrial firms are willing to pay 
these prices in order to have reliable supply.  The result is that power generation is a 
profitable line of business, one that can easily borrow to finance new capacity and service 
the loans from revenue.
5  
  In transport, most roads are toll roads, so that China has more tolled kilometers of 
roads than any other country in the world.  The toll per kilometer in China is comparable 
to toll rates in the U.S. or Italy (Figure 4).  China’s rate is lower than in countries such as 
France or Japan, but China’s cost of constructing a kilometer of expressway is also lower 
because labor costs are so low while the real productivity of Chinese construction firms is 
high.   Relative to per capita income, Chinese tolls are the highest in the world (Figure 5). 
It takes more than 2% of average per capita income to cover the tolls for a 1,200 
kilometer trip.  In most of the developed world it would take less than one-half a percent.  
Pricing policy for expressways in China is somewhat controversial since tolls are so high 
relative to per capita income.  But the Chinese adherence to this pricing policy has 
resulted in the expansion of expressways on an economic basis.  Most stretches of the 
system easily pay for themselves.  There are examples where China has taken a 
completed toll road and sold it on the stock market so that ordinary investors can benefit 
from this sound investment.   
  The result of the cost recovery policy is that it does not take ongoing large 
infusions from the budget to keep the infrastructure program expanding.  In 2006, there 
                                                 
4 The price shown for China is the regulated price for industrial users set by the central governments.  Some 
local governments have offered discounted power tariffs to foreign investors in special industrial zones, but 
the practice is now discouraged by the central government.   
5 An issue for the future is that China modestly subsidizes the price of power for households.  Since the 
residential sector only consumes 10% of China’s power, it is not financially difficult for power companies 
to cover this subsidy through the higher prices for industry.  However, as household power use rises toward 
the 30-40% of total consumption common in OECD countries, subsidization will not be financially 
sustainable.  
  12was US$80 billion of new investment in the expressway sector.  More than 40% was 
financed by tolls and fees collected on existing roads.   An additional 40% was financed 
by loans, which will be serviced by tolls collected on the new roads.  Direct foreign 
investment (also based on tolls) contributed an additional 10%.  Finally, there were 
capital grants from the state budget filling the last 10% (World Bank 2007a).   
  The impressive expansion of the railways has been similarly financed by the 
internal revenue of the system.  Official tariff rates for cargo are relatively low, but for 
years now an additional surcharge has been added to finance the expansion of the system.  
Thus, over the period 2000 to 2006 there was US$95 billion investment in China’s 
railroads.  Of this about 60% came from the railway’s income.  Thirty percent came from 
loans, and ten percent from provincial governments. 
  China here provides some useful lessons to other developing countries.  It may 
take some initial grants, from donors or the budget, to get the system expansion started.  
But if the resulting services are then priced economically, it will be possible for the 
power, road, rail, and other infrastructure systems (eg, telecom) to expand based on cost 
recovery.  If infrastructure services are priced too low, then it will be impossible to 
expand the system in a sustainable manner.  China’s experience shows that even in a low-
income country firms can be highly competitive while still paying full cost for 
infrastructure services. 
  Another lesson from China is that the government has been pragmatic about 
ownership.  State firms play an important role in power generation, rail, and water.  But 
the government has also permitted foreign investment in all these sectors, and at times 
has privatized infrastructure assets in order to get revenue to expand the system.  
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5. Agricultural development and rural-urban migration 
At the beginning of reform China was a largely rural country with 80% of the 
labor force employed in agriculture.  It should not be a surprise that the reforms really 
began in the rural sector.  The “household responsibility” system broke up the collective 
farms and returned most farming to a family basis.  Land was divided fairly evenly 
among households.  The initial use-right was quite limited; a family could not sell or 
mortgage the right.  But starting in 1978 China has continuously strengthened land 
tenure, and confidence in land property rights can be seen in the investment that 
households have made to increase the productivity of the land.  The household 
responsibility system immediately led to a 20% increase in grain production. 
China has also gradually liberalized agricultural markets giving peasants more 
freedom to choose what to produce and to sell on open markets.  China’s WTO 
agreement committed the country to a very liberal agricultural regime.  China’s market 
moves in agriculture were supported by strong state investment in research and extension.  
The result of the whole package has been that grain production increased modestly (11% 
between 1991 and 2005), while farmers increasingly shifted into high-value, labor-
intensive products such as tea (up 73% over the same period) or fruit (up 741%).  
Overall, real agricultural output has risen at the very healthy rate of 6.3% per year 
between 1991 and 2005. 
An area where China showed unusual foresight concerns its policies of taking 
land out of grain production, which is extremely water-intensive and not suitable for 
much of the Northern part of the country.  Some of the land has shifted to cash crops; but 
  14some has returned to “ecological use.”  China is one of the few countries in which forest 
coverage has increased significantly, from a low of 12% to 18% today.  The return of 
land to ecological use was pioneered in a series of World Bank-supported projects in the 
Loess Plateau region that have had a remarkable effect of re-greening a vast part of the 
Northwest.  Finding a balance between use of land for agriculture and for ecological use 
– this is an important lesson that China can bring to other developing countries, where 
often there is extreme pressure to keep increasing the amount of cultivated land.   
While the growth of agricultural output in China is impressive, it lags far behind 
the growth of industry, which has consistently been above 10%, and more like 16% in 
recent years.  China is a resource-scarce country whose comparative advantage lies in 
urban industrial and service activities more than agriculture.  At the beginning of reform 
urban labor productivity was already well ahead of rural labor productivity.  As China 
opened to the outside world and shifted ownership to the private sector, this productivity 
gap increased further (Figure 6).  Unskilled urban employees earn far more than the 
typical peasant, so that the individual incentives to migrate are strong.  The real output of 
a worker is much higher in industry and services than in agriculture, so that it is a gain for 
overall GDP as labor shifts from agriculture to urban employment.     
Pre-reform China had a household registration system that completely restricted 
people’s mobility, which has been gradually reformed over the past 25 years.  Each 
person has a registration (hukou) in either a rural area or an urban area, and cannot 
change the hukou without the permission of the receiving jurisdiction.  In practice cities 
usually give registration to skilled people who have offers of employment, but have 
generally been reluctant to provide permanent registration to migrants from the 
  15countryside.  Migrants who work in factories or perform manual labor in construction or 
household work can get status as legal migrants, entitling them to some public services, 
but they are not entitled to the full range of social benefits available to permanent 
residents.  This migrant population is referred to in Chinese as “floating population,” 
since the initial thinking was that such migrants would stay temporarily in cities and then 
return to the countryside.  In practice, however, a growing number of migrants are 
permanently relocating to cities. 
China’s hukou system has had some effect on the pace of this migration, but has 
not prevented migration from occurring on a large scale.  According to hukou 
registrations, China’s rural population has continued to increase, reaching over 900 
million by 2004.  Data based on where people actually live and work, however, show a 
rural population 200 million smaller (Figure 7).  Data on the labor force by sector show a 
similar trend: agriculture’s share of the labor force has declined from 80% at the 
beginning of reform to 60% today.  Industry and services have each expanded from about 
10% of the labor force to 20%.  This migration has nicely complemented what China has 
done to develop agriculture.  The reforms spurred agricultural production, while the out-
migration means that the income is spread over a smaller population. 
  Some of this rural-urban migration occurs within provinces.  But there has also 
been a clear tendency for population to shift from interior China to coastal locations.  
According to official data, in 2005 coastal Guangdong province had 75 million 
permanent residents plus 16 million legal migrants from other provinces.  Since all of 
those migrants are working, they make up about one-third of the labor force. Given that 
Guangdong has a good location and has built up excellent infrastructure, this migration 
  16enables China to get the most economic benefit out of its investments.  The migration 
also takes some of the population pressure off interior locations.  Remittances from urban 
migrants back to family members remaining in the countryside are an important source of 
rural income. 
It should be noted that the hukou system is somewhat controversial since it leads 
to two types of citizens in cities.  Until recently rural migrants could not easily bring their 
families to the city and enroll their children in school.  Recently a Ministry of Finance 
circular has clarified that cities in fact are responsible for providing public services for 
migrants and their families, though actual change on the ground takes some time.  In 
defense of the hukou system, it should be noted that China’s urbanization so far has been 
a relatively orderly process.  One does not see in China the kinds of slums and extreme 
poverty that exist in cities throughout Asia, Latin America, and Africa.  Nevertheless, 
urbanization goes on: the urban share of China’s population has risen from 20% to 40% 
during the course of economic reform.   It is very likely that another 200 million people 
will move to cities in the next 15 years, continuing to fuel China’s growth and poverty 
reduction. 
The role of migration from the interior to the coast can be illustrated through a 
comparison of the recent performance of Chongqing, an interior province of 30 million 
people, and Uganda, a landlocked country of similar size.  Uganda has been relatively 
successful, and between 2000 and 2005 its economy grew at a rate of 5.5% per year.  
Chongqing grew faster, at 10.3%.  But the biggest difference between the two locations 
concerns population.  Uganda’s population has been expanding at 3.4% per year, so that 
its GDP growth leads to an increase in per capita income of only 2.1% per year.  
  17Chongqing, on the other hand, has been experiencing population decline because of out-
migration, at a rate of 1.2% per year.  The migrants send remittances back that stimulate 
the local economy, and their departure takes pressure off the labor supply, making it 
easier to employ the remaining population at an ever-improving wage.  Thus, while 
Chongqing’s overall growth rate is twice Uganda’s, its per capita GDP growth rate is six 
times higher.  
Chongqing and Uganda illustrate a more general point.  In China, population 
growth rate is relatively high near the coast, and declines to close to zero or even negative 
rates as one moves inland (Figure 8).  In Africa, in contrast, population growth rates are 
about the same in interior countries (averaging 2.3% per year) as in coastal ones (2.4%), 
reflecting the relatively small amount of migration going on within the continent (Figure 
9). 
 
6. Limiting environmental damage 
  While China provides some interesting positive lessons for other developing 
countries, of course it is not the case that every aspect of Chinese policy has worked out 
well.  Hence, China also provides some negative lessons.  In general, there has been more 
increase in inequality and social disparities during reform than was necessary.  Water 
pollution has developed into a major problem.  Probably most serious of all the problems 
is the situation with air pollution.  Early in the reform period China developed some of 
the most air-polluted cities in the world.  The use of coal for power, industry, and homes 
combined with the rapid growth of the economy created very serious air problems.  By 
1982 total suspended particulates averaged about 1,000 micrograms per cubic meter in 
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country’s own air-pollution standard of 100. 
Since the mid-1980s there has been marked improvement in air quality, cutting 
the level of air pollution roughly in half.  Progress was achieved by moving industry out 
of inner cities and shifting home heating from coal to gas. The average city in the south 
now meets the annual average standard.  There has been progress in the north as well, 
though pollution levels there remain far higher. Even with this progress, however, air 
pollution levels in China are well above those in other locations in the developing world 
(Figure 10).  China has 20 of the 30 most air-polluted cities in the world. While the use of 
coal in inner cities has declined, motor vehicle use has been growing rapidly, creating a 
new source of air pollution. 
A recent study by the State Environmental Protection Agency and the World 
Bank for the first time used Chinese epidemiological data to estimate the excess mortality 
and morbidity caused by air pollution (World Bank 2007b).  The same study also carried 
out an innovative “willingness to pay” survey of residents in Chongqing and Shanghai to 
assess how much people valued the benefits of reducing air pollution.  This study 
estimated that the health costs of air pollution amount to 3.8% of GDP.  Many of the 
measures to control air pollution, on the other hand, are relatively inexpensive.  Key 
measures are to get the worst polluting vehicles off the road, shift bus and taxi fleets to 
natural gas, and invest in public transport rather than individual car use. 
An area where China could learn from Africa is the pricing of gasoline.  Despite 
being the second largest importer of petroleum after the U.S., China maintains a 
controlled and relatively low price for gasoline.  During 2000-2004 China’s diesel price 
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Relatively poor countries such as Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda all charge higher 
gasoline prices than China.  Given that China is at an early stage of urbanization and 
motorization, the country faces some fundamental decisions as to whether it wants to 
encourage a car-based society like the U.S. or one with more energy efficiency and sound 
public transport, as is found in Europe and Japan.   
This point about the low price of gasoline may seem to contradict the point about 
pricing of infrastructure, but it is actually a distinct point.  China is a highly resource 
scarce country, yet it chooses to price some key natural resources at low rates that do not 
reflect scarcity or negative externalities.  This is true not only for gasoline, but also for 
water use by households, which is priced on average at 75% of cost recovery.  So, 
household use of water, petroleum, and natural gas is implicitly subsidized.  On the other 
hand, the capital-intensive infrastructure sectors important for industry – power, roads, 
rail, ports, telecom – generally operate at full cost recovery.  The infrastructure pricing 
policy has enabled these networks to expand rapidly.  The low price for natural resource 
use by households, on the other hand, seems an unsustainable choice. 
 
7. Conclusions 
  Each developing country faces unique challenges and has to find its own way 
forward.  Countries, however, can learn from each other and adapt lessons taken from 
other experiences.  China’s success with growth and poverty reduction over a quarter 
century provides many interesting lessons.  On the positive side I have focused on the 
sound investment climate, openness to foreign trade and direct investment, cost recovery 
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urban migration as interesting areas that other developing countries might want to study 
further.   
  The way in which China has approached reform also provides interesting lessons.  
Chinese reform is sometimes characterized as gradual, but I do not think that this is an 
accurate characterization.  The actual change in institutions and policies in China over a 
25 year period is one of the most remarkable transformations in history.  It is hard to find 
other examples in which there has been so much change in such a short period of time.  
Rather than gradual, I would call Chinese reform pragmatic and experience-based.  China 
is a large and diverse country.  In many sectors there has been a process of pilot testing 
reform, evaluating results, and scaling up good ideas.  Sometimes this has been top-down 
and deliberate: foreign trade and investment were initially liberalized in special economic 
zones, and as good results were achieved the trade and investment reforms were then 
extended to more and more locations.  But the experimenting has often been bottom-up 
as well.  Much of the enterprise reform, privatization, and creation of a sound investment 
climate has been the result of experimentation at a local level.  Localities were given the 
objective of growth and the freedom to experiment.  Competition among cities has then 
led good ideas to disseminate broadly.   
  If there is a lesson here for other developing countries, it is to be pragmatic about 
reform.  Try out new ideas, evaluate results, and then expand ones that work.  There is 
also a useful lesson here for development agencies such as the World Bank.  The World 
Bank has never had a particularly important financial role in China, but it has financed 
pilots and innovations in a broad range of sectors.  In the early days of reform World 
  21Bank projects supported the development of grain markets, the power tariff reforms 
discussed above, the use of tolls to finance road construction and management, 
commercialization of rail and ports.  More recently the focus of the program has shifted 
to environmental and social issues.  World Bank-financed projects today support 
renewable energy technologies (wind, biomass), waste water treatment and clean-up of 
lakes and rivers, aforestation, urban transport management, rural health and education 
reform, and programs to help rural migrants integrate into urban employment. China uses 
the World Bank to help it introduce, evaluate, and disseminate innovations, providing a 
good model for how the Bank can help in successful middle-income countries.  
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Table 1: Growing out of the Plan 
  1978 1985 1995 2003        
 
Market price (percent of all goods 
subject to market price) 
      
 Retail  3  34  89  96 
 Producer  Goods  0  13  78  87 
 Farm  Commodities  6  40  79  97 
        
Ownership of Industrial Production 
(percent of output) 
      
 SOEs  77  --  33
a  22b 
 Collectives  23  --  36
a  6.4
b 
 Foreign,  Private,  Others  0  --  31
a  72
b 
Sources: Naughton (2006), OECD (2005), China Statistical Yearbook 2006 
Notes: a=1996; b=2004 
 
Table 2: World Bank-NBS survey of 12,400 manufacturing firms, 2005 
 
     State-owned   Foreign   Domestic private 
Percent of firms 
In  sample    8%   28%     64% 
 
Percent  of  total  assets  32%   27%     41% 
 
Rate of return on capital    7%    22%        19% 
 
Employment growth,  




  24Table 3: Investment climate and openness indicators, China and Africa 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
    
China Africa     ETH  GHA  KEN  NGA  TZA  UGA 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Sales lost from 
Power outages,  
2006 (%)    1.2  4.0    4.6  n.a.  8.0  n.a.     9.5   10.0 
 
Days to obtain 
Telephone line, 
2006    7.1
b 34    154.9
a n.a.  99.4
b  n.a.  23.3    12.8 
 
Days to register 
A property, 2006  32  110     43  382  73  80  123  97 
 
Average import 
Tariff, 2006 (%)   2.1  13.3    18.5  n.a.  6.2  n.a.  n.a.  13.7 
 
Longest time to  
Clear imports 
Customs, 2007  
(days)    12.3  22.2   25  n.a.  18.1  n.a.  26  17.1 
 
Cost to export,  
2006, per 
Container (US$)  335  1561    1700   822    1980     798      822       1050 
Note:  a, refers to data of 2002; b refers to data of 2003; n.a. refers to data unavailable. 
Source: World Bank http://www.enterprisesurvey.org; and 
http://rru.worldbank.org/DoingBusiness, and UNcomtrade country data base.   
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Figure 2. Growth of private firms and city 
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  26Figure 3. Electricity prices for industry, 
2005
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Figure 4. Highway tolls for cars
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  27Figure 5. Affordability of highway tolls
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Figure 6. Urban–rural labor 
productivity differentials 
Index of labor productivity: 
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  28Figure 7. Rural population is moving to 
cities
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Figure 8. Population growth, 1997-2005, and 











  29Figure 9. Population growth, 1997-2005, and 












Figure 10. Air pollution is high compared 
to other developing regions
Annual average PM10 concentrations observed in 
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